

*Social Policy in Latin America:
Predatory Vote Seeking, or Welfare State Building?*



The cases of Brazil and Venezuela

By
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“¡Nada ni nadie podrá detener la gran revolución Bolivariana!”
President Hugo Chávez, UN Speech (2009)

“Será o maior programa social já visto na face da Terra”
Luiz Inácio da Silva, about Bolsa Família (2004)

I. Introduction

In the era of democracy with adjectives¹ Latin America has confronted major challenges with uneven results. Among those challenges, social policy has played a crucial role in extremely unequal societies in which social mobility has never worked as promised. It seems as if the social elevator would have stalled during decades, deepening what has long been called the Latin America’s Achilles’ heel.

This paper aims to analyze the underlying symptoms of that pathology and the different governmental responses to treat it. Using the cases of Brazil and Venezuela, I propose to analyze the determinants of social spending and its impact on Latin America politics. In the first section, I establish the theoretical and analytical framework through which to study the matter at hand. Together with Ardanaz *et al.* (2010), I argue that social policy in Latin America is the result of strategic interactions of different actors that have shared and conflicted over incentives and expectations, and not the result of a benevolent planner, as for many years it has been thought.

I then identify the main variables and features that explain the policy-making process for social program with a particular focus on the last two decades². My goal is twofold: to grasp the institutional and political constraints of social policy in the continent and the determinants of success for social programs, based on the evidence provided by the *Misiones* (Venezuela) and *Bolsa de Família* (Brazil). If the social spending wants to benefit the poorest, the determinants of success are paramount. Similarly, understanding the institutional constraints as well as the policy drivers is necessary to answer the question that guides this paper. I argue that institutions matter and that the (de)institutionalization of party systems has affected the policy process in different ways. In the case of Venezuela, the features of its political system have contributed to policy discontinuity and political opportunism, whereas in the case of Brazil Lula’s first term was crucial to set up the pillars of an incipient social safety net.

¹ For a detailed overview of this discussion, see: Collier, D. and Levitsky, S. (1997), *Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research*, *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Apr., 1997), pp. 430-451. Available online at: http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/PS671/Collier_WP1997.pdf

² I use the first victory of Chávez in 1998 as the starting point for analyzing his social policy, although I refer to previous events in the region and in both countries to justify my arguments.

II. Politics and Social Policy in Latin America

With the rise of left-wing leaders, the political landscape of the continent has changed dramatically, offering an alternative to traditional approaches to government and governance. At the same time, the democracy debate in Latin America has become increasingly complex, if not confusing, since the proliferation of multiple typologies and labels -ranging from ‘electoral democracy’, ‘patrimonial democracy’ to ‘protodemocracy’- have aroused doubts regarding their conceptual validity. At one side of the spectrum, the idea of *Democradura* associated with U.S. policies after 9/11 has been challenged by what some analysts called the *Illiberal distributive democracy*³ model that has, in the Bolivarian Alternative led by President Hugo Chávez, a paradigmatic example (Whitehead, 2008).

In spite of the adjective we use, evidence arises: the electoral trend between 1998 and 2006 sent a clear sign against pro-market political forces⁴, with the exception of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and several Central American nations and resurgence of statist political forces (Corrales, 2008)⁵. Two factors, according to Clearly (2008), explain the timing of this leftist wave: a gradual tactical shift in the left’s approach to electoral politics, and the constraints imposed by the pact-like nature of many transitions.

The resurgence of the left has placed social policy at the core of the political agenda. In analyzing expenditures on social security and welfare, health, and education in Latin America, Huber *et al.* (2008) found that regime forms are important determinants of the amount governments spend on transfers and social services. Therefore, democracy matters in the long run for both social security and welfare, namely health and educational spending⁶. In addition, they argue that the difference between governments of varying political colors is apparently not in how much they spend, but in how they allocate what they spend. This is certainly consistent with our analysis, but does not explain how this allocation works in practice, i.e. how effective the allocation is in addressing the challenges and in targeting the right people. I argue that we need to apply a different analytical approach based on randomized evaluations⁷ to better explain it.

³ Smith, P. and Ziegler, M. (2008), Liberal and Illiberal Democracy in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 50, No.1, pp.31-57. The original definition of Zakaria defines illiberal democracy as one in which free and fair elections combine systematic denial of constitutional rights.

⁴ Leftist candidates have won in Venezuela (1998), Chile (2002 and 2006), Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2005), Bolivia (2006), and Peru (2006).

⁵ Corrales (2008: 40) defines these forces as incline to display a programmatic orientation to use laws, decrees, and other state resources to restrict market activities. This is in no way a new trend in Latin American, since between the 1930s and the late 1970s, statist political forces were dominant, e.g. Peronism in Argentina, or many of the military dictatorships with the big exception of Chile.

⁶ They also found that spending on health and education is more susceptible to economic and political constraints and opportunities than spending on social security.

⁷ In this sense, the ongoing research in the field of Development Economics is extremely relevant to analyze the impact of these programs in reducing poverty and inequality through randomized evaluation. See, for example, Cohen, J. and Easterly, W. (2009), *What Works in Development? Thinking Big and Thinking Small*.

Corrales and Penfold (2008), according to the level of competition and accountability of the country, propose four approaches to explain social spending: 1) “pro-poor” spending; 2) Underfunding; 3) Clientelism, and 4) Cronyism⁸. I will use them in my conclusion to categorize both Venezuela’s *Misiones*, and Brazil’s *Bolsa de Família*. Moreover, other factors have to be considered to understand the particular performance of programs implemented by ideologically similar governments in different countries. In this sense, the literature of populism, clientelism and neocaudillism provides some satisfactory answers.

Populism as a model of state-society relations has been widely studied in Latin America (Weyland, 2003; Schamis, 2006; Seligson, 2008). It has been defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated and uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers (Weyland, 2001: 14)⁹. Although analyzing in depth the phenomenon of populism is beyond the scope of this paper, it is crucial to highlight that the use of social funds has been associated in some instances with political interests¹⁰. As Penfold-Becerra underlines, under certain political circumstances, these funds can help either to “buy votes” for re-election purposes or to build political constituencies that strengthen support for the government (2007: 63-4).

Interestingly, Weyland (2003) affirms that political populism and economic liberalism have had unexpected affinities in contemporary Latin America, and that neopopulism has debilitated the organizational infrastructure of democracies. One reflection of that trend is precisely the weakening of check-and-balance institutions in countries like Venezuela¹¹. Evidence shows that this is correlated to clientelistic spending. Clientelism is understood in this sense as an exchange system based on “a complex of rules and practices for the organization, representation, and control of the demands and interests of society; these

Washington: Brookings Institution Press, and Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E. (2011), *Repensar la pobreza: Un giro radical en la lucha contra la desigualdad local*. Madrid: Taurus.

⁸ What the World Bank calls *pro-poor* spending means that the program is offered on grounds of true need and that actually benefits the poor. *Underfunding* happens when governments fail to provide sufficient funds for social programs. *Cronyism* consists of social spending that in reality is mere camouflage for direct subsidies to elites, mostly ‘families and friends’. *Clientelism* refers to spending that, unlike cronyism, is directed toward nonelites, but is nonetheless offered conditionally, expecting some kind of political favour back.

⁹ From an economic point of view, populism was defined by Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) in their classic study of *The Macroeconomics of Populism* as “an approach (...) that emphasizes growth and income redistribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation and deficit finance, external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive non-market policies”

¹⁰ This author claims that during the 1990s the use of these types of social funds encouraged the rise of neopopulist leaders in the region, e.g. social funds of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico, Carlos Menem in Argentina, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru where openly driven by political considerations.

¹¹ For a critical view, see ICG (2007), *Venezuela: La Revolución de Hugo Chávez*. Available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/latin-america/venezuela/19_venezuela_la_revolucion_de_hugo_chavez_spanish.pdf

relationships are based on political subordination in exchange for the discretionary granting of available public resources and services” (Heredia in García-Guadilla and Pérez, 2002: 93).

This discretionary power may be exacerbated by some institutional factors, i.e. it is usually exercised in contexts of strong executives, de-institutionalization and polarization, elements typically referred as characteristics of the old ‘caudillismo’ that has been replicated during particular periods and to a certain degree under the umbrella of a revitalized ‘neocaudillismo’.

All these features have influenced the policymaking process in Venezuela and Brazil in different ways. Despite these differences, several regional constraints prevail. Wiarda and Kline (2007) identify three main constraints in Latin American policymaking: underdevelopment, the political system, and the dominant position of the United State in the regional political economy. Regarding the latter, Przeworski (in Fukuyama, : 101) analyzes the gap between the U.S. and Latin America and the data is clear: in the year 2000 (two years after Chávez came to power and two years before Lula did) the average per capita income in the U.S. was \$ 28,129 compared with an average per capita income in Latin America’s 19 countries of \$ 5,844¹².

Effectively, inequality and the new left wave may partly explain the Welfare State building process in Latin America since this inequality gives the left a natural support to implement social programs. Nevertheless, these two elements alone provide an incomplete picture of the policy variation in Latin America. There are two main economic factors, or trends, that since the late 1990s have affected the process: 1) the regional recession of 1999-2002 and 2) the boom in the world economy (2002-2005) combined with high commodity prices. As a matter of fact, Schamis (2006) talks about a ‘Petro-left’ and how oil explains the way Chávez transformed himself from the damaged, almost-ousted president of 2002 to the assertive figure of 2004 and after.


In addition to these economic factors, there is one institutional variable that has critically influenced the political process in Latin America: the institutionalization of the party system¹³ (Schamis, 2006). Scholars argue that institutionalized party politics promotes policy moderation and mutual accommodation, and with them democratic stability. On the other hand, where party are disjointed the chance for parliamentary negotiation is weak and political disputes move to the streets. As a consequence, policy moderation declines along with respect for

¹² See Appendix for the last data available.

¹³ Following Mainwaring and Scully’s work, Corrales (2008: 64) defines party system institutionalization as the creation of systems in which parties are stable and valued by citizens, have roots in society and ties with civil organizations, and enjoy organizational independence from strong leaders. I use this as the main independent variable to explain the differences between Brazil and Venezuela.

democratic institutions and two outcomes could result: policy chaos, or super presidentialism, where Presidents concentrate too much power to stay in office¹⁴.

Figure 1. The Left and Populism*



* The circles are mine and show where Lula’s and Chávez’s government are placed along the spectrum. The graph captures both the populist and the left dimension: the left can occupy any space in the shaded area, whereas populism can occupy only the area marked by the oval (Corrales, *Ibidem.*).

¹⁴ The rise of Chávez has been explained by some analyst as a consequence of the Venezuelan party system: The decline of support for mainstream parties and the deinstitutionalization of the party system created, in turn, an opening for an anti-establishment candidate (Molina in Zúquete, 2008: 93).

III. *Misiones in Venezuela*¹⁵

“Many Venezuelans had become ‘charisma hungry’: They eagerly believed in populist promises without performing a thorough reality check” (Weyland in Zúquete, 2008: 91). For some, Venezuela is undemocratic. For others, it represents the best example of inclusive transformation, with popular support periodically reaffirmed at the polls (Whitehead, 2008: 28-9). This lack of consensus is what makes Venezuela both an interesting and a complex case to research¹⁶. But one point does seem clear: as Chávez usually repeats, the *Chavismo* is the consequence, not the cause, of the inherited situation¹⁷.

Likely, the *Misiones* (‘missions to save the people’) can be analyzed as both the cause and the consequence of *Chavismo* in the context of what Zúquete called ‘missionary politics’, i.e. a political leadership that aims to spotlight the unifying narrative theme of salvation that informs and holds together a populist discourse that is based on charismatic features (in the Weberian sense). The rise of Chávez represents both an increase in personality politics and the decay of parties as instruments for articulating interests, representation, and governance (Molina, and Pérez, 2004).

In this sense, the degree of party institutionalization and cohesiveness in Venezuela is low. This has produced serious defections from the ruling party and also political instability (Corrales, 2008: 65). The Chávez government has produced the highest degree of market reversal and also the largest degree of political polarization in Latin American¹⁸ (Myers, 2008). The politics of ‘Polarize and Punish’ had, in 2004, a turning point when Venezuela shifted from a situation of heightened power competition in 2003 to one of political energy asymmetry in 2005 (Corrales and Penfold, 2008).

These politics have had an impact of the design and the implementation of Chávez’s social policy, which can be characterized by two features: discontinuity and political opportunism. Before the April 2002 coup, Chávez had been relatively inattentive to social spending, and had dismantled most of the social programs left behind by the previous administration (Corrales and Penfold, 2008: 188). During these years, social spending declined in real terms. In late 2003, pushed by an oil windfall, things changed¹⁹.

¹⁵ For a more detailed description of *Misiones* see Appendix.

¹⁶ There is no clear consensus whether Venezuela can be considered a Delegative Democracy or an Electoral Autocracy (Myers, D., 2008)

¹⁷ The victory of Chávez in 1998 was indeed preceded by an alarming situation at different levels: with a party system flux and asymmetrical and around 20% of the population living with less than \$1 per day.

¹⁸ Corrales (2008) himself compares the situation to period in which the Sandinistas were in office in Nicaragua in the 1980s, although I doubt of the validity of the comparison.

¹⁹ Data and the budget are closely guarded. Myers (2007: 296) estimates more than \$25 billion, whereas Silva (2009: 227) calculates that in 2006 the expenditure was about \$13 billion and Corrales and Penfold (2008) estimates a total expenditure close to 4% of the GDP in 2004.

With the cooperation of Cuban personnel, the *Misiones* were launched. Because Chávez viewed the bureaucracy inherited as corrupt and tied to AD and COPEI, he used military commanders to allocate resources. Funding for the *Misiones* passes through the president's office from the state petroleum company *Petróleos de Venezuela* (PDVSA) in what constitutes a clear change from consolidated practices.

Penfold-Becerra (2007) is openly critical arguing that, given increased levels of electoral competition and weak institutional constraints, Chávez *Misiones* served two very different purposes: to manipulate the political context and to distribute funds directly to the low-income population, while Corrales and Penfold (2008) point out that Chávez has distributed resources according to different political criteria for different programs, but clientelism is present in most of them. Hence, clientelism and poverty interact closely in the case of Venezuela. I would rather argue that this has to be understood in a broader context of a dependent civil society. Certainly, the *Círculos Bolivarianos* fits within this category: although they performed valuable social work, they often reinforced clientelistic relations between Chávez and the voters, and they do not enhance the level of pluralism in the broader civil society (Hawkins and Hansen, 2006: 102).

In the end, these are the questions that remain unanswered: have the *Misiones* been effective and consistent with their objectives? Little evidence exists. On one side, women have become more engaged in politics at the grassroots level (Fernandes, 2007) and certainly they have tackled the issue of illiteracy. However, if one is to analyze the social policy according to its objectives, it is improbable that *Misiones* will be effective in the long run since the stakes are high -By 2021 there will be no poverty or misery in Venezuela, according to Chávez²⁰-, the resources finite and the political context uncertain.

*Bolsa Família in Brazil*²¹.

The relevance of studying the case of Brazil lies in the fact that *Bolsa de Família* is currently the largest CCT program and that while in the 1990s the Cardoso Administration in Brazil was a government of *reforms*, Lula's has been a government of *programs*, an important difference in the words of Corrales (2008: 63). This focus on addressing social imbalances through programs is qualitatively different than the approach used by Chávez, as is the economic and political context of Brazil.

Having said that, Lula's did not receive an easy inheritance: with an external debt of more than 45% of the GDP, foreign reserves fallen \$ 40 billion and a depreciation of the *real* of more than 40% many investors were concerned about the likelihood of a default. Lula was clever in announcing his commitment to the fundamental policies of the Cardoso's era. This continuity regarding macroeconomic policy (fiscal responsibility and budget surplus) contrasts

²⁰ Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias (ABN) "Chávez asegura que en el 2021 no habrá pobreza ni miseria en Venezuela". [29/09/2006]

²¹ For a more detailed description of *Bolsa Família* see Appendix.

with the case of Venezuela. Again, institutional factors play a key role: the continuity was facilitated by both the growing moderation within the Workers Party (WT) and the move to the center by Brazil's other political parties (Roett, 2010: 111).

In this sense, it could be argued that the cabinet of Lula was in a way more market-friendly than the Venezuelan under Chávez. More importantly, the degree of party institutionalization and cohesiveness in Brazil is high regarding the ruling party and medium for opposition (Corrales, 2008: 65). This has produced moderate changes in policy outcomes and the acceptance of existing institutional channels as the valid procedures for policy decision-making.

Federalism has played an important function in Brazil's political system²² as it has regarding social policy, whereas in Venezuela 'subnational' politics remained closely connected with patterns set in Caracas (Wiarda, 2007). In this sense, *Bolsa Família* was built upon some initiatives from Cardoso's era, but was preceded by some administrative missteps that affected the effectiveness of Brazil's social policy: As their control systems did not exchange information, a family could receive all four and another family, equally needy, could receive none. The values of the transfers were not harmonized so that the federal government was engaged in transferring to similar individuals different values under similar arguments (Soares *et al.*, 2010: 208-9).

Bolsa Família was created to overcome this problem and other major challenges²³. The results are more encouraging than in our previous case study. In terms of equalising impact the program was responsible for about 21% of the fall in Brazilian inequality (Soares *et al.*, 2010). It has also helped reduce extreme poverty and has improved education outcomes, without having a negative impact on labor force participation (*Ibidem.*). Where the program has failed to have its intended impact, in health and nutrition, supply-side constraints seem to be the principal problem.

²² Brazil is considered the most federal of Latin America's regimes, composed by 26 states and a federal district of the capital, Brasília.

²³ The nature of the program and its characteristics differ from the model of *Misiones*. Since the mid-1990's demand side programs linking cash to behaviour have been widely adopted across a range of countries (Brière and Rawlings, 2006). Mexico -and Latin America at the regional level- was pioneer in this type of policies.

IV. Conclusions

Contrary to the pessimistic view that invaded Latin America after the debt crisis in the 1980s, there are good reasons to think differently about the future of South America. The positive lesson is that despite the remaining polarization in Venezuela and the development challenges that Brazil confronts, Latin America has faced them without any democratic breakdown.

Both the CCT programs and social funds have proven successful in addressing some issues, but the correlation between the programs and the performance of several social indicators does not always equate causation. Despite its positive effects, concerns arise regarding the replicability of their success under different conditions, their role within a broader social protection system, and their long-term effectiveness in preventing the inter-generational transmission of poverty. The key question is –as Shifter (2008:4) points out- whether these programs are sustainable and whether they will help generate the employment that is essential to overcome long-standing inequalities and achieve broad-based development.

In addition, it is noteworthy that the two countries display a lack of public information disclosure on social expenditure²⁴. The difficulties to access to this information coupled with the lack of evidence in the case of *Misiones*, makes it necessary to develop new research to assess the actual impact of the programs. As a policy recommendation, one would suggest that researchers apply Randomized Evaluations (RE) to credibly understand the effectiveness of the program. At the micro-level, RE allows -as an evaluation methodology- establishing what programs work and which do not. Duflo argues that it has the possibility to revolutionize social policy. Informed policy needs hard data to come from this type of evidence.

Even if that research is conducted -and a more interdisciplinary approach is needed to make it possible-, the truth is that policy decision-making in developing countries could not be shielded from political pressure. If we apply Weyland's (2001) definition of populism to Chávez's leadership, populist features can be identified. When it comes to the program *Misiones* Corrales and Penfold (2008) would surely interpreted as a clientelist policy in the broader context of a populist leader, although in my opinion it seems part of a vicious circle where it is not clear if it is the causation, or the consequence.

On the other hand, the evidence shows that Brazil's social policy is aligned with the broader project of building a Welfare State that can truly serve as a safety net for the poor. Hence, in the aforementioned typology *Bolsa Família* would fall within the category of 'pro-poor' spending, although some authors will question this statement. Certainly, the government's use of discretionary power has caused concerned (Sousa, 2008).

²⁴ There is no data about the following indicators for Brazil and Venezuela in the World Bank database, by large the best source of information on development: social protection rating, quality of public administration rating, transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector, and policies for social inclusion/equity cluster average.

At the end, the idea that institutions matter and that the respect of law and procedures, or the absence of it, affects policy outcomes have revealed true. While in the case of Brazil the respect to institutional channels to resolve conflicts, the existence of centripetal forces and a better consolidation of its party system have contributed to the existence of a more coherent policy²⁵, Venezuela seems more permeable to use social policy as a political tool. Any conclusion on this regard is provisional and depends of the post-Chávez era.

The future of social policy in Latin America will be surely constrained by the political leadership of the region, but also by some structural conditions: Latin America has a lack of saving that could affect its future due to the constant trade-off between social spending and macroeconomic stability that the region faces. Pro-cyclical fiscal policy and short term policies is a risky combination in the face of a crisis or in the context of a downturn in commodity prices. Neither Latin America nor the world can afford another lost decade.

²⁵ It is relevant to highlight that after Lula left the Brazilian Presidency, Dilma Rousseff maintained the fundamentals of the system, whereas the approach of Chávez was a sort of ‘tabula rasa’.

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APPENDIX

Box 1. Misiones – Venezuela

Misiones - Venezuela

First, Chávez created a Unified Social Fund directly managed by the Arm forces in the Plan Bolívar 2000 to implement programs in health, sanitation, care for the indigent, public transport, and housing. Later the Chávez administration established *Misiones*.

Silva, 2009: 226-7

These missions (misiones in Spanish) started out to provide health care in the poorest areas in the country, particularly the shantytowns of the urban centers (*Misión Barrio Adentro*). After that, a series of so-called misiones provided various social services, ranging from teaching literacy in rural and urban areas (*Misión Robinson*) to helping poor adults study for a high school degree (*Misión Ribas*). The government also focused on the need to provide citizens with identification cards (*Misión Identidad*). ID cards were required to access the cash transfers granted to people to encourage their participation in the social pro-grams, and also required by the National Electoral Council for voting. After the two-month strike by PDVSA's management and oil workers in 2003, the Chavez administration designed another program to distribute subsidized food directly to the poor by creating discount stores through-out the country (*Misión Mercal*). Yet another government program aimed at creating jobs through the promotion of cooperatives (*Misión Vuelvan Caras*).

These misiones were financed through opaque and non-budgetary mechanisms; namely by transferring oil revenues directly from PDVSA to a special fund managed by the presidency. According to PDVSA's financial statements, in 2004 the fund managed more than 5 billion dollars (close to 4.5% of GDP). Measured by size, the misiones were probably one of the largest social fund experiments administered in Latin America in the last decade.

Penfold-Becerra, M. (2007)

* The Venezuelan government lists 30 *Misiones* (May, 2012). See:

<http://gobiernoenlinea.gob.ve/home/misiones.dot>

Box 2. Bolsa Família - Brazil**Bolsa Família – Brazil**

Bolsa Família is one of the largest conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in the world. The program started in 2003 with the merger of four existing conditional and unconditional cash transfer programs of the federal government: *Bolsa Escola*, a minimum-income grant related to primary education; *Fome Zero* and *Bolsa Alimentação*, two income grants related to food security, the former unconditional and the latter conditional on health checkups and immunization updates; and *Vale Gas*, a subsidy to help poor households buy cooking gas (Soares, Ribas and Osório, 2010: 174). Each program had its own financing scheme, implementing agency, conditionalities, and information system.


Bolsa Família provides a conditional monthly transfer to poor households—those that earn less than R\$120(US\$68) per capita monthly—with children up to seventeen years of age and/or a pregnant woman with up to a maximum of three children. Unlike other programs in the region, it also provides a monthly transfer to extremely poor households—those that earn less than R\$60 (US\$34) per capita -regardless of their composition. For extremely poor childless households, there is no conditionality attached to the transfer. The program requires a school attendance of 85% for school age children, updated immunization cards for children less than seven years old, and regular visits to health centers for breast-feeding or pregnant women. By the end of 2006, Bolsa Família had been scaled up to include 11 million households.

Soares, Ribas and Osório, 2010

Poverty and inequality in Latin America


Income Inequality in LAC

Ratio of incomes of wealthiest 20% to poorest 20% of population



Poverty Trends in Latin America

Percent of national, urban, and rural populations



Source: CEPAL, 2011